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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of
Section Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah
State Constitution Article I, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated
Section 77-1-6 (g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code
Annotated, and the Rule of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The defendants herein were convicted of controlled
substance violations.

The defendants tendered a plea of

guilty to the offenses but reserved the right to preserved
the defendant's right to appeal from the defendant's motion

to suppress.

The defendant presented to the the trial court

a motion to suppress arguing that the initial stop of the
defendant Edenfield was without lawful cause and that the
search warrant was issued without probable cause.
The trial court denied the defendant motion to suppress.
A copy of the ruling is attached hereto within the addendum.
The factual basis for such motion is set out in the statement
of facts.

A transcript has been prepared of said hearing.

Defendants herein argue that the trial court errored in
the denial of such motion. The trial court made findings of
facts in support of the court's ruling which are without
factual basis.
The defendant Edenfield was stopped

prior to the

issuance of the search warrant. The stop was made at
approximately 10:35 a.m. but the search warrant was not
executed til 11:32 a.m.

The officers herein arrested,

detained and search the defendant Edenfield prior to judical
authorization. No other authority existed to justify the
search.
The officers herein executed a search warrant on the
Blomquist home. Said warrant was not based on sufficient
probable cause.

Defendant contends that the affidavit is

based on hearsay from unidentified informants lacking
reliability.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The matter came before the Court on hearing of the
defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The matter was heard before

the Honorable Boyd K. Park on August 26, 1993.

The Court

denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Subsequent
thereto, the defendants entered pleas of guilty reserving
their right to appeal on the issues presented herein.
At the suppression hearing, the prosecution called in
support of their position, Officer Cody Cullimore, Officer
Shawn Adamson, Officer Michael Blackhurst, and Officer Dennis
Harris. The defense called Linda Edenfield. A copy of the
Court's ruling is attached within the addendum.
Officer Cody Cullimore testified that he was a peace
officer for Pleasant Grove City on the date of March 11,
1993.

He occupied the position of detective in the Pleasant

Grove Police Department. T5L9.

On the subject date of March

11, 1993, Office Cullimore was involved with the Narcotics
Task Force for Utah County.

T5L12.

He was assigned to

maintain surveillance on the Roger Blomquist home.

T5L16.

The home is located at 126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah,
less than one block from the Pleasant Grove Police
Department.

T5L25.

The surveillance commenced at the hour

of 9:00 a.m. on March 11, 1993.
3

T6L3.

Officer Cullimore was working in cooperation with other
officers of his own Pleasant Grove Police Department and the
Narcotics Task Force.

He was under the supervision of

Officer Blackhurst of the Pleasant Grove Police Department.
T6L9.

As Officer Cullimore commenced his surveillance,

Officer Blackhurst was attempting to prepare a search warrant
to commence a search of the Blomquist home.

T6L9.

Officer

Cullimore anticipated that the search warrant would authorize
a search of the residence, the vehicles at the residence, and
the persons at the residence.

T6L14.

Officer Cullimore knew

that Mr. Blomquist owned the home and Linda Edenfield was a
visitor.

T6L20.

Office Cullimore observed Mr. Blomquist and Ms.
Edenfield leave the residence and get into a truck which
belonged to Roger Blomquist.

T6L25.

He noticed that they

traveled to a convenience store known as BJ's Short Stop
located in Pleasant Grove (T7L11); two blocks from the
residence.

T7L14.

Mr. Cullimore knew that the defendant

Blomquist had a traffic warrant issued for his arrest.
T7L20.

Officer Cullimore advised the patrol unit that the

vehicle was moving and he would like it stopped before it
left the area.

T7L25.

The vehicle was stopped at the

location of 60 South Main in Pleasant Grove, Utah.

Mr.

Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Ms. Edenfield was
4

taken out of the vehicle and detained while they determined
what would happen next.

T8L7-10.

At the Preliminary Hearing, Officer Cullimore testified
that the arrest occurred prior to the execution of the search
warrant authorizing the same, it occurred at approximately
10:00 a.m. on the morning of March 11, 1993.

T9L11-13.

The

officer's police report indicates that the arrest of Ms.
Edenfield and Mr. Blomquist occurred between 10:30 a.m. and
11:00 a.m. on March 11, 1993.

T9L14-15.

A search warrant

was not executed by the Court or Magistrate until 11:32 a.m.
on March 11, 1994.

T9L20.

The officer reports that he had made the stop of the
vehicle; arrested Roger Blomquist on the traffic warrant; and
Ms. Edenfield was requested to step out of the vehicle and
then subsequently arrested. Officer Cullimore reports that he
had received information over the radio that a search warrant
had been executed. Upon cross examination, Officer Cullimore
conceded in his police report, that he had advised that the
search warrant was being merely prepared at the time of the
arrest and search. T10L7-9.

At the 'Motion to Suppress1

hearing, Officer Cullimore advised that he had received a
report that the search warrant was prepared or issued.

This

communication was shortly after the traffic stop was made and
while they were at the site of the vehicle stop T10L18-24.
5

The Blomquist residence is located at 12 6 South Main.
BJ's Short Stop is 100 West Center.

T12L7-8.

It would take

only a couple of minutes for Blomquist/Edenfield to get to
the Blomquist residence from BJ's Short Stop. T12L13.
Defendants were returning home when stopped one-half block
from the Blomquist residence.

T12L14-15.

Blomquist vehicle was made at 10:35 a.m.

The stop of the
T12L21.

The officer initially reports that Ms. Edenfield was
simply stopped and detained because she was a passenger in
the Blomquist vehicle.

T13L3-4.

However, it is noted that

three police cars were present at the time of the initial
stop for the supposed traffic warrant.

T13L17-19.

The stop

was made at approximately 10:35 a.m. and Blomquist and
Edenfield were booked in the Pleasant Grove Police Department
at 11:00 a.m.

The police department is only one block away

from the Blomquist residence and 1 1/2 blocks from the
supposed traffic stop.
At the time of the initial vehicular stop, Officer
Cullimore was aware that the search warrant had not been
executed but the officers were in the process of obtaining
it.

T14L8-9.
Officer Cullimore reports that Ms. Edenfield was

transported to the Pleasant Grove Police Department/Jail
between the time of 10:40 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.
6

T17L5;

within

five minutes from the original traffic stop.

T17L9.

Officer Cullimore received instruction to transport her to
the Police Department from Blackhurst.
Department, Ms. Edenfield was searched.

At the Police
The basis for such

search being that the officer believed that she was covered
within the scope of the search warrant, although it was not
signed nor issued.

T18L1.

Ms. Edenfield was searched by a

female dispatcher in a closed room.

T18L5.

She was

subjected to a strip search at the Pleasant Grove Jail.
T18L9.

Her purse was also searched at that time.

T18L18.

This was also done on the basis of the purported search
warrant.

T18L20. Ms. Edenfield1s purse had been taken from

her person at the time of the initial stop.

T20L6.

A small

pack of Methamphetamine was found to be contained within said
purse.

T20L17.

The booking time of Ms. Edenfield into the Pleasant
Grove Police Department was 11:00 a.m.

T19L7.

This was

preceded by the stop, detention and the search.
Officer Harris testified being called by the
prosecution.

Officer Harris is the Deputy Utah County

Sheriff currently assigned to the Narcotics Task Force for
Utah County.

T22L18-23.

Officer Harris was assigned to

assist in the search warrant execution that day.

He had also

received the assignment to assist Officer Cullimore in the
7

stop of the Blomquist vehicle.

T23L6-9.

Officer Harris

advises that he received information that the search warrant
had been issued.

He received that information at 11:39 a.m.

T25L17-21.
Officer Harris's credibility as to the time sequence is
bolstered by the fact that he maintains an accurate record of
the dates and particular times herein with the use of a tape
recorder which magnetically stamps the time and date as he
records the conversation.

T27L10-11.

He verifies the

accuracy of the tape recorder clock by comparing it to his
wrist watch.

T27L14-23.

He was not at the scene but

reported to the scene upon request. He received the
communication of the vehicle stop at 10:38 a.m. T28 L 13.
Officer Harris reports that the vehicle had been
impounded at 11:04 a.m.

At 11:39 a.m., Officer Harris made

an entry on his tape that the search warrant had finally been
signed and officers were on their way.

T29L2-6.

Officer

Harris advises that at the time of the stop of the Blomquist
vehicle, the search warrant had not been signed.

T29L21-22.

He was at the Blomquist home at 11:39 a.m. when he learned
that it had, in fact, been signed.

T30L14.

Officer Harris reports that Ms. Edenfield was detained
because they had received prior information that she was, in
fact, bringing drugs in.

T33L5.
8

Sergeant Blackhurst had

apparently advised Officers Harris and Cullimore that he
wanted Ms. Edenfield questioned and taken to the Police
Department (T33L23-25); this detainment occurring prior to
the warrant's execution. They did so although they had not
received any communication that the warrant had actually been
signed.

T35L11-16.

Officer Blackhurst was called by the prosecution.
Officer Blackhurst is a police officer with the State of
Utah/ employed through the Pleasant Grove Police Department,
currently assigned to the Utah County Narcotics Task Force.
T37L13-21.

Officer Blackhurst was advised over the air that

the Blomquist vehicle was leaving the Blomquist residence.
Officer Blackhurst reports that the search warrant was
signed at 11:32 a.m. by Judge Dimick in the Orem Circuit
Court.

T41L13-19.

Officer Blackhurst supervised the search

of the Blomquist residence.
of 11:46 a.m.

The search commenced at the hour

T42L15.

Officer Blackhurst advises that he did not advise
Officer Cullimore to take Ms. Edenfield to the police station
for questioning.

T43L21-22.

The prosecution then called Officer Shawn Adamson to the
stand.

Officer Adamson is a police officer to the Utah

County Sheriff' s Office, assigned to the Narcotics Task
Force.

T48L23-T49L2.

Officer Adamson indicates that they
9

were unsure of Blomquist/Edenfieldfs destination and felt it
necessary to

stop them until they could complete the search.

T50L2-4.
Ms. Linda Edenfield was called by the defendants.

She

advised that she was stopped by the Pleasant Grove police
officers on March 11, 1993.

T53L2-3.

They pulled the

vehicle over and took Mr. Blomquist out one door and placed
him in the other police car.

They took Ms. Edenfield out the

other door almost contemporaneously and placed her into a
police car.
station.

They then transported them to the police

They advised her at the police station that she was

going to be voluntarily forced to complete a strip search.
They then took her into a room to commence the search.
T53L6-12.

The officers completed the strip search upon Ms.

Edenfield.

T53L15-16.

Ms. Edenfield was advised that she would either
volunteer for the strip search or they would stand right
there until the warrant was signed and then she would be
subjected to a strip search.

T53L21-23.

Th..s was

communicated by one of the Pleasant Grove police officers.
T54L1-6.
matter.

Ms. Edenfield reports that she had no choice in the
They placed her immediately into the police car and

took her to the police station.
to submit to the strip search.
10

T54L20-23.
T55L1.

She was forced

She was advised to

submit to a cavity search where she was ordered to "bend over
and spread them".
lips of her vagina.

T55L12.

She was ordered to pull apart the

T55L16-17.

They checked her clothing

one piece at a time and then gave them back to her.
20.

They then placed her into a cell.

went through her purse.

T55L24.

T55L22.

T55L19-

Then they

She advised that this was

completed well before the hour of 11:00 a.m.

She was in the

room at the police department for quite awhile.

They came to

get her keys to the car and then brought her keys back to
her.

They then once again retrieved her keys and did not

return them a second time.
in the Blomquist vehicle.

T56L11-19.
T57L1.

She was a passenger

She reports that at the

initial traffic stop, they took Mr. Blomquist from the
vehicle and then turned to her and advised her that "yes
please come with me".
in the police car.

They immediately thereafter placed her

T57L10-18.

The search of the Blomquist residence was commence at
11:49 a.m.

It was based upon a search warrant executed by

Magistrate, John C. Backlund, of the American Fork Circuit
Court.

The search warrant authorized the search of the

persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edenfield.

It also

authorized the search of the residence of the suspects
located at 126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and
surrounding outbuildings.
11

In addition, the search warrant authorized a search of
the suspect vehicle, a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada
license plate #693 EPS.

The search warrant was issued based

upon an Affidavit in Support of and Motion for a Search
Warrant.
The affiant is Michael Blackhurst, a Pleasant Grove
Police Officer.

The substance of the data contained within

said search warrant is the following:
1992

INFORMATION

In September 1992, Detective Andre Leavitt received
information from an unnamed confidential informant that Roger
Blomquist was involved in distribution and use of controlled
substances.

See paragraph 4.

No other information is given

regarding the basis of such a conclusion by said unnamed
confidential informant.

The only supporting basis being that

this supposed confidential informant has supplied information
on as many as four individuals who were involved in
distribution of controlled substances and his or her
information has proven reliable.

The date of the affidavit

is April 11, 1993; seven months after the fact.
1993

INFORMATION

It is reported in the affidavit that on January 28,
1993, Mr. Blackhurst received information from an anonymous
informant who stated that Linda Edenfield, a girlfriend of
12

Roger Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown
Chevrolet Corvette.

The anonymous informant stated that the

reason for these trips was to pick up controlled substances
to be delivered back to Roger Blomquist.

It is reported by

this anonymous informant that these trips occur approximately
every two weeks and Linda carries a gun concealed in a
compartment behind her seat.

See paragraph 6.

Upon inquiry

as to the reliability of said informant, Officer Blackhurst
disclosed that this supposed tip came from an ex-boyfriend of
Ms. Edenfield.
The affiant then reports that on March 4, 1993, the
affiant again received other information from an anonymous
informant who stated that a telephone conversation had been
overheard in which Roger Blomquist stated Linda Edenfield
would be delivering a load within the next five to six days.
See paragraph 7.

No other data regarding reliability is set

out in the affidavit.

We do not know the source of the

information nor the reliability of the data.
On March 4, 1993, it was discovered that a tan and brown
Corvette was not at the residence of Roger Blomquist.

This

contradicted the previous tip and draws into question its
reliability.

It is reported that on March 11, 1993, this tan

and brown Corvette finally appeared at the Blomquist
residence.
13

1993-ADDITIQNAL

DATA

Apparently a surveillance was conducted upon the
Blomquist home.

Officer Lee Fox recalled observing a vehicle

bearing Utah license plate #942 BHN.
registered to a Linda lorge.

The vehicle was

Officer Fox recalled that he

conducted a search warrant on the lorge residence in 1989
wherein the son of Linda lorge was arrested on several counts
of distribution of controlled substances.

No further

information is given as to the identity of any individuals in
said vehicle, nor participation, nor appearances at said
home.

See paragraph 9.
A record check was made of Roger Blomquist and Linda

Edenfield.

It was found that Roger Blomquist had a criminal

record involving a controlled substance with a conviction in
March, 1984.

See paragraph 10.

The record indicated that

Linda Edenfield had a criminal history indicating that she
had been charged but never convicted of possession of cocaine
in 1988 and two counts of possession of controlled substances
in 1989.

See paragraph 11.
SUMMARY OF

1.

ARGUMENT

Prior to judical approval of a search warrant to

search the Blomquist home and its occupants, the Court must
be presented an affidavit setting out sufficient basis to

14

establish probable cause. In the current case, the affidavit
was lacking.

The warrant was lacking because:

a. The warrant was anticipatory of drugs be brought into
Utah from Nevada. It was based on a tip from an informant.
The affiant did not provide any

basis upon which the judge

could determine the informant's reliability and consequently
it lacked the requisite probable cause.
b.

The affiant attempted to corroborate the tip by

referring to a previous informant's tip. Said tip was also
unreliable since it failed to indentify the basis upon which
the informant believed Blomquist to be traffiking in
narcotics. Further the information was stale, being seven (7)
months old.

Additional information was supplied. It also was

stale and lacked relevancy.

The additional information

including that the defendant Blomquist had previously been
convicted of a controlled substance violation in 1984.
Defendant Edenfield had been arrested but charge with
criminal offense in 1989.

A vehicle was seen in the

proximity to the Blomquist home. The vehicle belonged to
another whose son had been associated with narcotics in 1989.

2.

The officers herein detained, arrested and then

strip-searched the defendant Edenfield prior to the search
warrant's execution. No justification existed to make the
15

arrest excepting the warrant which was not executed til one
hour later.

No exigent circumstances existed to justify the

officer's taking such action.

ARGUMENT
MEMORANDUM

OF LAW

An individual's right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizures is protected and guaranteed both by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by the
provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.

The provisions are almost identical.

The

Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
The balance between public interest and the individual's
constitutionally guaranteed right to personal security and
privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.
Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 (1979).
POINT I
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS LACKING.
PROBABLE CAUSE.

IT DID NOT RAISE TO THE LEVEL OF

THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS AN ANTICIPATORY

WARRANT AND WAS BASED ON:

16

A.

CONCLUSIONARY STATEMENTS

B.

UNNAMED INFORMANTS LACKING RELIABILITY

C.

STALE AND INCONCLUSIVE INFORMATION
PROBABLE CAUSE DEFINED

It is fundamental that probable cause needs to be found
within the four corners of the affidavit to support a search
warrant's issuance. The Fourth Amendment requires that when a
search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, the
affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support
the determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause
exists.

State v. Droneburgr 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989)

United States v. Rubior 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983).
Probable cause means more than 'bears

suspicion

'.

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within the affiant's knowledge and which they had reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or
is being committed.

Brinegar v. United Statesf 338 U.S. 160

(1949).
The cause necessary to make a thing probable is
determined under an objective standard.

An affidavit is

sufficient when it demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion
the likelihood that an offense has been or is to be committed
and there is sound reason to believe that a particular search
17

will turn up evidence of it. United States v. Nocella, 84 9

F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988.), United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d
1068 (8th Cir. 1987), United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075
(11th Cir. 1990) . Further, for probable cause to be met, the
affidavit must set out the reliability of the informant or
information.

Rubber-stamping police officer's request is

forbidden. State v. Proneburg, infra.
A.

Anticipatory

Warrants

In the present setting, the officers anticipated, based
on the April, 1993, tip, that Edenfield was to deliver to
Utah narcotics within five (5) to six (6) days from March 4.
Based on this tip, Officer Blackhurst sought

to obtain the

warrant.
In cases of anticipatory warrants, an affidavit
supporting the application for anticipatory warrant must
show:
1.

The agent
contraband

believes
that
is going to

2.

How he has

obtained

3.

How reliable

his

4.

What part the government
in the delivery.
United
882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir.

a delivery
occur;

this

of

belief:

sources

are;
agents
States
1989).

will
v.

Judicial officers must then scrutinize whether
probable

cause

to believe

that

the
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delivery

will

play
Garcia,
there

occur,

is
and

whether

there

contraband
takes

is probable

will

place.

be located

cause to believe
on the premises

that

the

when the

search

Moreover, when an anticipatory warrant issues,

the magistrate should protect against its premature execution
by listing in the warrant conditions governing the execution
which are explicit, clear and narrowly drawn so as to avoid
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.
United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1989).
Here the affiant failed to set out the reliability of
the sources. The April tip was received from an unnamed
informant.

(This tip was received from the angry ex-

boyfriend of Edenfield.)

No effort was attempted to set out

the reliability of the tipster.

None was available.

No

effort was made to set out why the informant believed the
drugs were to be delivered on or before March 9 or 10.
The warrant and its supporting affidavit is much like
the warrant issued in State v. Droneburg, supra.

In

Droneburgr the State conceded that probable cause was
lacking.

The affidavit revealed that the Sheriff had

received confidential information from a confidential
informant that methamphetamine was to be delivered to a
residence in Panguitch.

The informant advised the Sheriff

that the individual delivering the methamphetamine had
departed California and was to arrive in Panguitch at a
19

specified time.

The Sheriff advised that the information was

from a reliable informant.

He had used this informant before

and had found him to be reliable.
The significant difference in Droneburg is that the
informant was actually known by the Sheriff there and he had
used him before.

Here, we simply have a tip from an unknown

informant.
If this April, 1993 tip fails to meet probable cause,
does the remaining portions of the affidavit bootstrap this
unsubstantiated tip into probable cause?

The prosecution

attempted to corroborate this tip by referring to a
conclusionary statement that in September, 1992 (seven months
preceding), an informant advised fellow Officer Leavitt that
Blomquist was involved in the distribution of narcotics. This
conclusionary statement apparently came from an informant who
had supposedly provided reliable information in the past
(Droneburg).

No effort was made to find out why the

informant believed this had occurred or if it was ongoing; he
merely offered his conclusion. State v. Droneburgf supra.
B.

Conclusionary

Statements

An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence for probable
cause and a wholly conclusory statement fails to meet this
requirement.

Sufficient information must be presented to the
20

magistrate to allow that official to determine probable
cause; his actions cannot be a mere ratification of the
conclusions of another.
(1983) .

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213

State v. Droneburg, supra.

No attempts were made within the affidavit to suggest
that the unsubstantiated tip of April was reliable. The
question of reliability is crucial to discriminate between
those which one can logically base a conclusion as opposed to
those which may be generated by anger, hostility, or revenge,
as here,when the angry ex-boyfriend is the informant. United
States v. Delgadillo-Valesquez, 856 F.2d, 1292 (9th Cir.
1988). Warrant and affidavit are suspect when they deal with
unnamed informants; cautions must be exercised. United States
v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984).

State v.

Droneburgr supra.
C.

Unnamed

Informants

The information delivered through the affidavit must be
reliable.

In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the

Supreme Court pronounced that it is first "highly relevant"

as to how the informant
secondly, whether

obtained

the informant

the information
has sufficient

and,
reliability.

The Courts have held that unnamed informant's reliability
needs to be established within the affidavit.
v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984).
21

United States

State v.

Droneburg, supra.

A tip is not reliable when the

investigating officer or affiant has no means of knowing from
whom it came or the past performance of the informant.

United States v. Delgadmo-Valesguez, 856 F.2d, 1292 (9th
Cir. 1988).
An unnamed informer's tip does not rise even to the
level of reasonable cause, let alone probable cause.

An

officer cannot, without further corroboration, stop a
motorist based on a radio dispatch without factual
foundations for the relayed message.
Neb. 772, 438 N.W.2d 131 (1989).
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1992).

State v. Thompsonr 231

See also State v. Roth, 181

In Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State

Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971), the court
held that the informer's tip is not sufficient to warrant
arrest.
Here the unsubstantiated April tip is from an unnamed
informant without evidence of reliability.

The magistrate

was not provided any facts upon which to base the informant's
reliability.

The magistrate could not weed out those tips

which may be generated, as this one, on ex-boyfriends,
angered guests or vengeful persons.

Without these facts, a

magistrate would be simply a 'rubber stamp1 for the police
validating their every request.

22

The magistrate must

scrutinize the affidavit to protect the citizenry from
unwarranted intrusions.

State v. Droneburg, supra.

Consequently, in this case of an anticipatory warrant
based on an unsubstantiated tip, does the remaining portions
of the affidavit allow one to conclude that probable cause
exists?
D.

Staleness

It is the fundamental principle of search and seizure
law that information furnished in the application for the
search warrant must be timely.

A warrant application based

upon stale information of previous misconduct is
insufficient.

It fails to create probable cause that similar

or other improper conduct is continuing to occur.
States v. Bascerof 742 F.2d 1335.

United

A warrant may be suspect

because information upon which it rested was arguably too old
to furnish present probable cause.
740 F.2d. 1331 (4th Cir. 1984).
conviction bear any relevance?

United States v. McCallr

Does a 10 year old
Does a narcotic charge

without conviction raise to any level of relevance?
There are no statutory limits.

However, it is manifest

that proof must be of a fact so closely related to the time
of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a probable cause
finding.

SGRO v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). It is

fact sensitive whether the information is stale or
23

substantiates a continuing enterprise.

State v. Singleton,

214 Utah Adv. Rep. 30(June 1993).
The reported September, 1993, tip is based on an unnamed
informant that seven (7) months earlier indicated Blomquist
was involved in narcotics.

(This tip rises only to the level

of State v. Droneburg facts, in that, it fails to specify how
the information was obtained.) Staleness would also apply to
the fact that Linda Iorge's vehicle appeared at the Blomquist
residence and Officer Fox recalled searching Iorge's
residence and finding that her son had used narcotics.
dates back to 1989.

See paragraph 9 of affidavit.

This

It

presumes that the Iorgefs vehicle had something to do with
controlled substances and that she or her son continued to be
so involved since 1989.
It is also reported that Blomquist had one controlled
substance conviction in 1984. See paragraph 10.

Edenfield

had never been convicted but had apparently been charged with
two counts involving controlled substances in 1988 and 1989.
See paragraph 11.
In controlled-buy situations, information of 3 days
length was found to be too stale where no evidence of
continuing drug possession or sales existed.
David, 326 N.W. 485 (Mich. App. 1982).

People v.

Forty-two and 44 day

old information was stale and a warrant relying on it is
24

suppressible.

People v. Briolor 228 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. App.

1975).
In Commonwealth v. Maloner 567 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. App. Ct
1987), a 7-11 day delay after observing marijuana was not
permissible. In Sheppard v. State, 521 S.2d 288 (Fla. App.
1988), a 30 day delay was too long.

See also U.S. v. Stout,

641 F.Supp. 1074, U.S. v. Nealr 500 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.
1974) .
Here they attempted to stretch a 1984 conviction to
1993; suggesting Blomquist must thereby continue to be
involved.

They attempted to suggest the April tip must be

reliable since the mother's car being at the Blomquist home's
vicinity has some relevance since her son used drugs in 1989;
that Edenfield's 1988 and 1989 drug charges have some
relevance when they are 4-5 years old and did not even merit
a conviction; and that a September 1993, tip supposedly from
a reliable informant rendering his unsubstantiated conclusion
that Blomquist is involved in distribution or use of
controlled substances.
What portions of the probable cause justify a search of
the Blomquist home, its residents or vehicles at the home?
POINT II
THE STOP, DETAINMENT AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF EDENFIELD
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE WARRANT NOR EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
25

Ms. Edenfield was stopped by police at 10:35 a.m. She
was detained, arrested, strip searched and then arrested; all
before the warrant's execution at 11:32 a.m.

The officers1

conduct was based on the desire to detain, search and
question her.

All before the warrant's authorization.

She was a passenger in the Blomquist vehicle.
criminal acts were observed.

No

No justification existed for

her detainment, search or arrest.

The police anticipated

that the anticipatory warrant would be issued and jumped the
gun .
To justify a particular intrusion, a police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which
taken together with rational inferences, warrant such an
intrusion.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968), State v.

Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989).
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court struck down a search and detention of a
passenger.

The Supreme Court held that the officers'

detention of the passenger, beyond what was reasonably
related in scope to the traffic stop, was not justified by
any articulable suspicion that the defendant had committed a
crime.

The Court held that the leap from asking the

passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrant check
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on her, severed the chain of rational inferences of specific
and articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to
support as yet an inarticulable suspicion or hunch.
Any further detention for investigative questioning
after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic
stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment only if the
detaining officer has reasonable suspicion of serious
criminal activity.

The detaining officer must be able to

articulate a particularized and objective basis for their
suspicion that is drawn from the totality of the
circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure.

United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).

See also State v. Robinson, 797

P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127

(Utah).

Here none existed.

Here Blomquist had been stopped and arrested based on a
traffic warrant.

The cause and detention is suspect due to

the officer's ulterior intent.

However, his detention is

justified under current Utah law;

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d

1127 (Utah); but restrictions still apply.

The detention may

not last longer than warranted by the initial detention.
Edenfield should have been free to go.
The Utah Courts have allowed officers in certain
situations, preceding the search warrants execution, to take
27

defined and restrained action to maintain the status quo of a
purported drug transaction.

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255

(Utah 1987) . In Ashe., there was a need to preserve evidence.
However, only in a few specifically and well-delineated
situations may the officer's action precede the warrant's
execution.
In State v. VanHolten, 767 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct.App.
1988), this Court struck down the search of a home, prior to
the warrant's execution, where there was no danger of
evidence being destroyed.

Here no exigent circumstances

existed to justify the initial and unlawful intrusion.
evidence was going to be destroyed.

No

Officers were not at

risk.
The officers need to await the warrant's authorization.
State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.1991).

If they

jumped the gun, they presume the warrant's execution thereby
displacing the need for a neutral and independent review by
an impartial magistrate. They may strategically act
opportunistically without judicial restraint awaiting the
arrival of the warrant to cover their actions.
CONCLUSION
Search warrants are not only preferable but
constitutionally mandated to preserve valued freedoms of the
citizenry.

Police officers are limited in their actions by
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constitutional mandate, enhancing our freedoms from
unwarranted searches and seizures.

The independent review by

an impartial and neutral magistrate of probable cause is a
guarded freedom not to be taken lightly or displaced by
police.
Officers cannot presume a Court's approval of a warrant.
A search warrant must be based on sound reasoning meeting the
constitutionally mandated test of 'probable cause1.

A search

warrant should not be issued based on rumors, speculation or
possibilities.

The police nor the Courts should be utilized

to cause nuisance or seek revenge.

The reported tips of

unnamed informants need corroboration to prevent unwarranted
intrusions.
We cannot suppose criminal behavior by acts as a mother
visiting a location if her son used drugs four years
previously.

We presume people to be innocent and that 10

year old convictions bear little relevance to current acts;
that charges of drug involvement are useless unless followed
by convictions.

We do not allow police nor their informants

to supplant the judiciary by just adopting their conclusions.
The Courts and the Constitution are our protections
against unwarranted civil violations.
DATED this

day of
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•°kr\*/xLr^\

i
r 1994.

•E

Defendants/Appellants
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Attorney General
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ADDENDUM
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 931400385 and
931400386
DATE September 15, 1993

vs.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST

CLERK: LHH
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on August 26,
1993. The plaintiff was represented by James R. Taylor, Esq. The defendants were
represented by Shelden R. Carter, Esq. Police officers Cody Cullimore, Dennis Harris,
Michael Blackhurst and Shawn Adamson were sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Linda
Edenfield (now known as Blomquist) was sworn and testified for the defendants.
The Court having heard the oral testimony , the arguments of counsel and having read
Defendants' Motion to Suppress and the memorandum in support thereof and Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss makes the following findings
and ruling:
1.

Defendants have filed a Motion to Suppress alleging that their constitutional rights

under the provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14, have been violated
by the police officers having stopped the vehicle in which the defendants were riding,
personally searching the defendants and searching the Blomquist residence and placing the
said defendants under arrest. Defendants contend that the probable cause affidavit in support
of and motion for a search warrant was insufficient for the issuance of search warrants in the
following particulars:

1

(a)
(b)
(c)

The affidavit is based on conclusory statements and rumor,
The information is stale,
No factual basis for the reliability of anonymous informant,

(d)

Information acquired by the police officers was not reliable.

Defendant Edenfield contends that she was placed under arrest and searched prior to the
issuance of a warrant to search her person without articulable probable cause.
2.

Officer Cullimore testified that on the 11th day of March, 1993 certain police officers

began a surveillance of the Blomquist residence. Officer Blackhurst was involved in
acquiring a search warrant for the Blomquist home, the persons of defendants Blomquist and
Edenfield, and the Edenfield automobile. While the Blomquist residence was under
surveillance the defendants left the residence and entered a vehicle owned by defendant
Blomquist. The police officers subsequently stopped the Blomquist vehicle and Officer
Cullimore testified as to the approximate following times: The Blomquist vehicle was
stopped sometime around 10:30 a.m.; Received a radio call that the warrant had been issued;
Transported the defendants to the police department from approximately 10:40 a.m. to 11:00
a.m., sometime within that time period; Mr. Blomquist was booked and arrested at 11:00
a.m. Ms. Edenfield had her purse with her and was not taken into custody until the officer
had received a radio call that the warrant had been issued. An examination of the search
warrant indicated that it was issued at 11:30 a.m.
3.

Officer Harris testified that he participated in towing the Blomquist vehicle to the police

station and that he followed standard procedure. Officer Harris testified to the following
time sequences: The time of the stop of the vehicle was 10:38 hours.; The time of the
telephone call to determine if the search warrant had been signed 11:39 hours.; Impounded
the Blomquist vehicle 11:09 hours. Officer Harris was present when defendants were
transported from the cite of the vehicle stop to the police station and testified that Sgt. Fox
had told him at that time that the search warrant had been signed.
4.

Officer Blackhurst testified that he prepared and signed the probable cause affidavit in
2

support of motion for a search warrant. He took the said affidavit to Judge Dimick for his
review and approval. Officer Blackhurst had informed the officers not to do any searching
until the search warrant was issued. Officer Blackhurst called Officer Cullimore and told
him that the search warrant had been signed. Officer Blackhurst believes that the time
shown on the search warrant is actually the wrong time. Officer Blackhurst testified that he
took from 10 to 15 minutes driving from the courthouse to the Blomquist residence. Officer
Blackhurst testified that an inventory search started at 11:46 a.m.
5.

Officer Adamson testified that he went with Officer Blackhurst to acquire the search

warrant. That Officer Blackhurst made a telephone call to tell the other officers that the
search warrant had been signed.
6.

An examination of the probable cause affidavit indicates that the affidavit was

subscribed and sworn to before Judge Joseph Dimick on the 11th day of March, 1993 at
11:30 hours. An examination of the search warrant indicates that it was dated on the 11th
day of March, 1992 at 11:30 a.m.

The search warrant appears to have been typed from a

form and that the typist picked up June 1992 and no one contends that this was actually
signed other than the year 1993.
7.

It is not the intention of this court to recite everything that was said in the probable

cause affidavit inasmuch as the affidavit is available and this court by reference incorporates
the terms of the affidavit, but will make specific reference to specific provisions in the
affidavit in this memorandum decision. It is also not the intent of this court to cite all of the
cases that have been cited in the memorandums submitted by counsel. The court, however,
is familiar with and has read the cases submitted by counsel and the court is convinced that
the current law in the state of Utah is the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the
affidavit and the search warrant. The Utah courts have used the Agular-Spinelli two-prong
test as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances. The informant's reliability and basis of
knowledge to relevant considerations, among others in determining the existence of probable
3

cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances. State v. Singleton. 214 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 30 at 32.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical common sense decision
whether (given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, and knowing
the veracity and basis of knowledge of a person supplying hearsay information) there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The
duty of a reviewing court is simply to insure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
...concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates. Jones v. United States, citations
omitted.
8.

The affidavit of Officer Blackhurst in paragraphs 4 through 7 contain (1) information

received from a confidential informant known to Officer Blackhurst, had proven to be as
reliable through other investigative methods; (2) information from an anonymous informant
on January 28, 1993; and (3) information from another anonymous informant on March 4,
1993. That based on the information received from the three informants a surveillance was
conducted at the residence of defendant Blomquist. On March 11, 1993 the Corvette
described by the anonymous informant arrived at the Blomquist residence. In paragraph 9 of
the affidavit Sgt. Lee Fox observed a vehicle registered to a Linda Iorg and Sgt. Fox had a
memory of conducting a search on the Iorg residence in 1989 where the son of Linda Iorg
was arrested on several counts of distribution of controlled substance. Paragraph 10
indicates that a records check was made and the records check indicated that defendant
Blomquist had a criminal record involving controlled substance with a conviction in March of
1984 and that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest from the Pleasant
Grove City court. Paragraph 11 indicates that a records check of defendant Edenfield
indicated a criminal history whereby Edenfield had been charged with possession of cocaine
in 1988 and two counts of possession of a controlled substance in 1989. The record did not
indicate any convictions. The Corvette vehicle observed at the Blomquist residence was in
fact the vehicle referred to by the anonymous informants and the vehicle was in fact
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registered to defendant Edenfield
9.

Even though the information received in September of 1992 from a confidential

informant known to Officer Blackhurst was approximately six months old at the time of the
acquiring of the search warrant, nevertheless such information as contained in the affidavit
was consistent and corroborated by further informants and by the independent investigation
by the police officers.
10. This court finds that considering the totality-of-the-circumstances contained in the
affidavit there was a sufficient basis for the magistrate in making a practical and common
sense decision to find that there was a fair probability that the evidence sought would be
found in the Edenfield vehicle, in the Blomquist residence and/or on the persons of
Edenfield and Blomquist. This court finds the search warrant was based upon adequate
probable cause and lawfully issued.
11. This court admits that the testimony regarding the time sequences on March 11, 1993
are somewhat confusing. Despite the confusion in the actual hours testified to by the
officers, the officers were consistent in that they had received notice that the search warrant
was signed before any search was made of the vehicle, persons or Blomquist residence.
12. Defendant Blomquist was arrested because of the outstanding warrant in the Pleasant
Grove City court. It is the further finding of this court that defendant Edenfield was not
searched until such time as the search warrant had been signed. It is the further finding of
this court that the Blomquist residence and the Edenfield vehicle were not searched until the
search warrant was appropriately executed by Judge Dimick.
13. This court further finds that the stop of the Edenfield vehicle and the temporary
detention of the defendants prior to the physical arrival of the search warrant was
appropriate. This court adopts the facts and the application of the facts to the law of this
state regarding exigent circumstances as set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum on pages 6,
7, 8 and 9.
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14.

Defendant Edenfield contends that the police officers had no right to search her purse.

Edenfield had the purse with her when the vehicle was stopped and Edenfield took the purse
with her to the police station. This court finds that the defendant's allegation that the purse
of Edenfield was not a part of her person to be without merit.
15.

The court further adopts the statement of facts and law as applied to the facts of this

case from the Plaintiffs Memorandum regarding search and seizure of evidence from
Edenfield lawful under the good faith-inevitable discovery rule. The court finds that the law
as stated by counsel is in fact the law of the state of Utah and that should for any reason
evidence taken from the purse of Edenfield be subject to the exclusionary rule, that evidence
would still be admissible under the tfinevitable discovery" or the "independent source"
doctrine.
16.

Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied.

17.

Counsel for the plaintiff shall prepare findings and conclusions and order for this court

consistent with the above and submit the same to counsel for the defendants for approval as
to form.
Dated this 15th day of September, 1993.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

cc:

Utah County Attorney
Shelden Carter, Esq.
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